introduction
The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Na tionality Act had as one major policy objective the ex pansion of opportunities to immigrate from Southern and Eastern Europe. An examination of immigration trends to the United States from one country of this region-Greece-indicates, however, that the initial upsurge in immigration after 1965 has been followed by a period of steady decline.
Some see this trend mainly as the result of a declining Greek demand for immigrant visas. An alternative possibility, which this paper seeks to explore, is that the decline in immigrant visa issuance is related to the way opportunity is being structured for those who might otherwise intend to immigrate. Among the components of this structure of opportunity one may include: the design of the immigration law itself, as amended; the way the law is administered, through both administra tive regualations, especially in Washington, and through the exercise of administrative discretion, especially at the Consular level; the economic and social conditions in the receiving country; the economic situation in the home country; and alternate opportunities for emigra tion.
This study focuses on the structure of opportunity presented by the design of the immigration law and the ways in which it is administered. This is not to gainsay or ignore the role of the other factors. Greece is used as a case study to elucidate the relationship between migration rates, demand, and opportunity structure.
The study hypothesizes that the structure of oppor tunity to immigrate can be considerably circumscribed, both by the way the Immigration Act is designed as well as by administrative regulations and the exercise of administrative descretion, at home and abroad.1 This, in conjunction with economic conditions, especially in the United States, affects the issuance of immigrant visas, particularly to certain classes of potential im migrants-those with no close American relatives, those with no needed skills, and more generally, young «have nots» in search of a better way of life. When nor mal channels of obtaining immigrant visas become1 blocked, attempts are made to use alternate and sometimes unforseen channels. These may be formally -1 wish to thank D'rs. Charles Keely, Joseph Fitzpatrick, and Doro thy Dohen for their helpful comments. I also want to thank the United States' consular staff in Greece for their cooperation in help ing me to carry out this project. I am grateful to Prof. Vassilis Filias for inviting me to use the facilities of the National Center of Social Research during my stay in Athens.
1. Partly, the structure of opportunity created in this manner is in tended; but partly it is an unintended, latent outcome of the intended, planned features of the Act. Robert K. Merton discusses the dif ference between manifest and latent functions in Chapter 1 of his book, Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1949. legitimate, such as adjustment of status, or illegitimate, such as illegal entry. To examine these propositions, the study investigates what has happened, since the enact ment of the 1965 amendments, in the case of Greece.
The data used in this study include immigration statistics gathered from the annual Reports of the US Department of State and the Immigration and Natura lization Service; the annual Reports of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, describing trends in visa issuance and changes in administrative regulations associated with these trends; discussions with consular personnel and l&NS representatives about the administration of American immigration law, and observation of how im migration law is actually administered; Greek statistics on emigration trends to Northern Europe, and on economic trends in Greece.
US immigration policy prior to 1965
To understand what happened to Greek immigrant visa issuance after the 1965 amendments became effec tive, it is necessary to go backwards in time and observe the situation of countries like Greece under the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. The provisions of the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act embodied American immigration policies of long stand ing.2 Among these were:
First, qualitative restrictions-some going back to the 1880s-against certain classes of aliens, such as the mentally and physically ill, the criminal, and those unable to support themselves; Second, quantitative restrictions, going back to the early 1920s. The 1952 Act placed a ceiling of roughly 154,000 on the number of immigrant visas which could be issued annually to countries of the Eastern Elemisphere (Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania); Third, a national origins quota, first instituted in 1921, which heavily discriminated against the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. Basically, access to the annual 154,000 immigrant visas by particular na tionalities was determined by the proportion they con stituted of the total white population in the United States in 1920. According to the revised 1952 formula, each nationality's quota was one sixth of one per cent of the number of its inhabitants in the continental USA in 1920. Greece's quota under this formula was 308 im migrant visas; Great Britain's was 65,361.
Fourth, a good neighbor policy, which allowed unrestricted immigration of persons born in the in Fifth, a policy of family unification, embodied in two types of provisions. According to the first, applicants who were immediate relatives, like alien spouses of US citizens, were issued immigrant visas without having to wait for a quota number. They were assigned nonquota status, classified as nonquota immigrants, and issued nonquota immigrant visas. A second device to ac complish the objective of family unification was the assignment of preference status. This was a status assigned within the quota limitations, to various types of close (but not immediate) relatives, like parents of US citizens under the 1952 Act. Persons assigned prefe rence status did need a quota number. But they were assigned priority in access to visas among quota appli cants of their nationality.
The McCarran-Walter Act not only embodied long standing American immigration policies; it also contain ed a number of new policies and emphases. These in cluded:
First, preference status for skilled workers. The first preference in the McCarran-Walter Act was assigned to skilled workers and their dependents. This policy was to be continued, in modified form, in the amended 1965 Act.
Second, abolition of sex discrimination in the is suance of immigrant visas.
Third, the abolition of racial discrimination against Asians. In accordance with the provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act, Asians in principle were no longer excluded from either naturalization or immigra tion.
period prior to 1965
Prior to the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Greece had an annual quota of 308 visa numbers, which were always used in their entirety. As in the case of other countries with small quotas under the national origins provisions of American immigration law, the great majority of Greeks who received immigrant visas were immediate relatives and other categories of visa applicants not sub ject to quota limitations. For example, in the year preceding the 1965 Immigration Act, more than 85 per cent of the total number of 2,082 immigrant visas issued went to nonquota applicants.3
An examination of the distribution of quota visas ac cording to preference category under the McCarranWalter Act shows that the priorities set by the Act, and the percentage of visas set aside for the different preference categories, determined the visa issuance pat-3. US Department of State, Visa Activities 1963 , 1964 ,1965 Table I .
Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικών Ερευνών, a1 τετράμηνο 1980
tern for Greece, as well as for other countries subject to that preference system (see Chart I).
Since the quota for Greece was so small, the number of applicants far exceeded the number of available visas in each preference category. The first three categories were entirely used up, each to its legal limit, every year. The first preference went to Greek immigrants with re quisite skills and their dependents. Second preference visas were issued mainly to parents of citizens, and third preference visas to unmarried sons and daughters of resident aliens. No visas remained to be issued to brothers and sisters or other close relatives, or to non preference applicants. In other words, persons of Greek descent were allowed to bring in, and did so, a max imum of 154 skilled workers and their dependents, 92 parents of US citizens, and 62 adult sons and daughters of resident aliens.
It is important to note that neither the number nor the types of quota visas issued prior to 1965 cor responded to demand. Instead, the 308 visas issued, and the composition of the successful candidates, reflected the structure of opportunity for obtaining visas under the McCarran-Walter Act.
policy changes embodied in the 1965 Immigration Act4
The 1965 Law embodied new policies which affected visa issuance patterns throughout the world. One major policy change was the abolition of the national origins quotas. Instead, each country within the Eastern Hemisphere (Europe, Asia, Africa, and Oceania) was given competitive access to a maximum number of 20,000 visas annually on a first come, -first served basis, within a numerical limtation of 170,000 for the Eastern Hemisphere. The competitive position of the applicant depends on: his preference status; his priority date; and how rapidly he completes the needed administrative steps (filling out applications, providing documentation, etc.).
It is important to understand the difference between the old and the new systems. Under the 1952 Act, fix ed, non-transferable quotas were allocated to each country. Under the new Act, there is simply a specifica tion of an annual maximum numerical limitation (of 20,000) beyond which applicants born in a given coun try cannot be issued visas; but no country has a «right» to these numbers except in competition with all other countries of the Eastern Hemisphere.5
A second policy change embodied in the 1965 Im migration Act involved the preference system for Eastern Hemisphere countries. The Act established seven preference categoried-four for the purpose of family reunion, two for workers, and one for refugees. The new law also placed less emphasis on immigrant visa issuance to workers as compared to relatives, in troduced distinctions between skill levels, and assigned higher preferences to those in professional and kindred occupations than to those qualified to do other types of work.
A third change involved labor certification pro cedures. Until 1965, the burden of proving «adverse ef fect» was placed on the Secretary of Labor. The present Law, on the other hand, specifies that workers shall not enter unless the Secretary of Labor certifies that there are not sufficient able and qualified workers available in the United States and that the aliens would not adverse ly affect wages and working conditions. Since 1965, labor certification has been required of all Eastern Hemisphere immigrants entering under the third and sixth preference categories (preferences based on work skills) and under the nonpreference category. (For a comparison of the preference systems under the 1952 and 1965 legislations see Chart I).
1965-1968: the visa pool
The national origins quota system was phased out during a two and a half year transition period, ending June 1968. For this period, a general visa pool was established, made up of unused visas from undersubscribed countries and available to preference ap plicants from oversubscribed countries with long waiting lists. During this transition period, countries re tained the quotas allocated to them under the pre-1965 legislation, even if these exceeded the 20,000 country maximum of the new legislation. Those quota numbers unused by the undersubscribed countries were put in to the visa pool at the end of each fiscal year for use by the oversubscribed countries during the next fiscal year. Applicants from oversubscribed countries had access to the visa pool according to their preference status and their priority date.
The objective of a transition period was to allow time for the backlog of demand from preference applicants throughout the Eastern Hemisphere to be taken care of through the visa pool mechanism, and at the same time to prevent visa numbers from becoming completely unavailable to the traditionally undersubscribed coun tries through an abrupt change to a first-come firstserved system.
Greece was one of the countries which benefited im mediately from the visa pool mechanism. In the first year of the transition, the total number of immigrant visas issued to persons of Greek birth jumped from 2,082 to 9,097.
Of the 9,097 immigrant visas issued to Greeks in FY 1966, almost three quarters-6,583-were numerically limited visas.6 This numerically restricted type of im migration became the prevalent one throughout the world, beginning with the transition years.
During the transition period, the rapid increase in visa issuance to Greeks was mainly due to: access to the visa pool; priority of visa numbers as a result of the past long delay in processing Greek applications because of the absence of available visas; and demand for relative preferences which were given higher priority by the new Act (e.g. P2s) than by the old.7 However, im migrant visa issuance to Greek applicants did not ap proach the 20,000 limit in any of the transition period years despite the ongoing demand because of the struc tural limitations inherent in the visa pool mechanism.
the post-transition period
In FY 1969, Greeks were issued a total of 19,588 im migrant visas, a peak in issuance that has not been reached since. Although the abolition of the national origins quota system resulted in a substantial drop in immigration from Northern and Western Europe, im migration from Europe as a whole increased slightly over FY 1965. This was the net result of a shift in the traditional high volume of immigration from north western Europe to southern Europe. Immigrants -mostly relatives of US citizens and resident aliens-from Italy, Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia, and Spain-accounted for over three fifths of the European total in F Y 1969 as compared with less than one fifth in FY 1965.8 Immigrant visa issuance to Greeks, which in F Y 1965 had constituted a mere 1.7 per cent of the European total, represented 16 per cent by F Y 1969.
The worldwide trend since 1969 has been a steady in crease in the total number of immigrant visas issued; this trend has been the result of increases in the number of visas issued in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. However, an examination of individual continents and countries within the Eastern Hepisphere indicates that the trend is not true of Europe in general nor of Greece in particular; in both, a steady decline in immigrant visa issuance has occurred, as Table 1 Table 2 the significant drops in numerically limited visas since 1969 were due to drops in fifth preferences, especially in FY 1970 , 1972 , and 1976 . In F Y 1972 , there were alsctsignificant drops in sixth preferences, and decreases in nonprefe rence visa issuance. Both phenomena were related to a new, restrictive US Labor Department policy, which suspended Schedule C job pre-certifications and requi red applicants with these job qualifications to be indiv idually certified.11 9. Tables 1 and 111, 1969 Visa Report; Tables 1 and XV , 1970 -1976 10. Tables 1 and VI, 1969 Visa Report: Tables 1 and VII , 1970 -1976 11. Schedule C was one or tnree labor certification schedules pupnsn-;d by the US Department of Labor. Schedule A was a list of shorta ge occupations in the Federal Register. Schedule B listed various unskilled jobs, such as dishwasher and charwoman, for which there was no need for foreign workers, anywhere in the US, accord ing tô the Labor Department. Schedule C was a list of occupations in After January 1969, the visa availability pattern for Greece was the same as that for the Eastern Hemisphe re countries generally. Specifically, the relative prefe rences-first, second, fourth, and fifth-were current ever since January 1969. Among skill categories, the sixth was backlogged until 1971, and the third (pro fessional applicants) until 1976. Nonpreference status applicants had substantial waiting periods during the entire period under consideration.12
The 1965 Immigration ana Nationality Act gave the opportunity for those demands to be met which confor med to the new opportunity structure-namely, of clo se relatives and workers needed in this country during times of economic affluence. In conformity with the op portunities offered by the 1965 amendments, Greek pa rents and brothers and sisters joined their American re latives by the thousands. Skilled and unskilled workers with qualifications acceptable under labor certification procedures also obtained sixth preference and nonprefe rence visas to work in this country, often in small busi nesses for employers of Greek descent. However, dras tic reductions in these types of visas resulted from the more restrictive measures of the Department of Labor introduced in the early 1970s to protect American labor during the economic recession.
Greece's failure to reach its annual statutory maxim um of 20,000 immigrant visas, it must be emphasized, does not in itself signify a lack of demand. It simply si gnifies that the competitive demand for immigrant visas in other parts of the Hemisphere has been great, due to such factors as the population size of the countries in short supply in most parts of the country, but not nationwide. These were nonprofessional occupations, like television repairman and sec retary. Prior to 1970, no job offer was needed for occupations listed in Schedule C. The I&NS or the Consulate made the labor certifica tion decision on the spot. D. North Many explanations have been offered to account for this trend. Foremost is the argument that the emigra tion to the United States has been complemented, and is being replaced, by Greek emigration to Northwestern Europe, especially the German Federal Republic. Al though tehre was a mass exodus to Germany in the early sixties, there was a steady decline in permanent migration during the 1970s. According to the Statistical Yearbook of Greece, the number of Greek permanent emigrants to Germany in 1970 was 65,285; in 1976, it was 6,829. Temporary emigration, which represents mostly the Greek merchant marine, has also shown a significant drop since 1974. 13 An explanation which attempts to account for both the decline in emigration from Greece and in some cases, for the return migration of emigres, is the improv ed economic situation in Greece during the 1970s. Ac cording to a variety of indices, economic conditions in Greece during this period have ameliorated. For ex ample, hourly payment of workers in industrial establishments of ten or more employees went up from 17.3 drachmae in 1971 to 54.0 drachmae in 1977. Per capita gross national income ât current prices went up during the same period from 33,439 drachmae to ap proximately 93,000 drachmae. Among telephone subscribers, the number of persons per telephone ap paratus went down from 7.3 in 1971 to 4.2 in 1976.14 The return of Greeks from abroad also has been link ed to the improved economic situation of Greece. In a recent article on the subject of return migrants, Washington Post correspondent Mary Anne Weaver noted that there were 20,000 retired Americans living in Greece, who were receiving thirtyfive million dollars in social security retirement checks each yean15 On the other hand, some return migration to Greece, and deci sions not to emigrate to the USA, are «involuntary», in the sense that they are brought on by economic reces sions abroad rather than by economic affluence at home. For example, US consular officials have pointed out that during times of economic downturn in the United States, American relatives of Greeks advise them to delay their applications for immigrant visas 13. National Statistical Service of Greece, Statistical Yearbooks of Greece, 1971, Table 11:26, p. 46 and 1977, since they find themselves unable to undertake the responsibilities of support during such lean periods.
In Washington, Government policies (e.g. tightening of labor certification procedures) and, at the local level, ad ministrative actions of consular personnel, can make it more difficult (or easy) for persons to immigrate. For exapple, by tightening the criteria of economic support -which is within the discretionary power of con suls-it is possible to increase the number of exclusions. By favoring the elderly for nonpreference visas, com petition for jobs in the USA is minimized, but the is suance of visas to nonpreference applicants who require labor certifications is reduced.
The exercise of such administrative discretion affects the issuance of nonimmigrant visas as well as of im migrant visas. As the demand for nonimmigrant visas steadily rises, consuls, by controlling nonimmigrant visa issuance, can and do indirectly affect immigrtion rates by anticipating adjustments of status. The control of nonimmigrant visa issuance is by law part of the consul's job. According to American immigration law, all nonimmigrants are considered immigrants unless the applicants can prove otherwise. The consuls must determine whether the applicants have so proved. Con suls utilize three main criteria in making this judgment: applicants' residential, job, and family ties to their coun try of origin. That leaves a lot of room for the exercise of administrative discretion. It often works against the young, who are not yet firmly anchored in their society through jobs and marriage. It also favors the haves over the have-nots, since the former are viewed as likely to have a reason to emigrate. In a time of economic downturn, these considerations are likely to be accentuaded.
Applicants may apply for any one of twelve types of nonimmigrant visas, the most common of which is the tourist visa. Once in the United States, they may apply for adjustment of status, provided they are eligible to receive an immigrant visa, are admissible to the US for permanent residence, and that visas are immediately available. Ajustments of status tend to vary inversely with immigrant visa issuance abroad: the more preference and nonpreference visas are issued abroad, the less adjustments of status are made in the United States in any one year (and vice versa) . This is so because the combined total of immigrant visas issued abroad plus adjustments made in the United States must not exceed the annual numerical limitations for the two hemispheres or for each country prescribed by American immigration law.
The trend in status adjustment has been downward since 1973 for the Eastern Hemisphere as a whole, for Europe since F Y 1974, and for Greece, from 1020 to 873.16 16. 1969 Visa Report, Tables I (worldwide and Eastern A comparison of the issuance of immigrant visas for Greece before and after inclusion of adjustments shows which preference categories benefit most from these ad justments. According to the data in Table 3 , the ad justments are not randomly distributed. The greatest impact of adjustments is on the third, sixth, and non preference categories, in other words, categories which require labor certifications. One can surmise that these are applications for admission which are so difficult to obtain abroad that one alternative route is to come to this country as a visitor, try to find a job here, and then attempt to adjust status. Consuls are supposed to try and spot this kind of potential immigrant, who is produced by the structural limitations inherent in the law. Although the manifest intent of the law is not to make detectives out of con sular officials, nor to promote devious behavior among applicants for nonimmigrant visas, the latent effects of the law press in that direction.
Illegal migration, to some extent, is also the unintended consequence of immigration legislation which makes it difficult for certain persons to come to this country legally. Who, after all, are the illegal migrants? Often, these are persons who are either without the right kind of job qualifications or too poor to be considered good risks for admission to this coun try. The only way these persons can enter the United States is illegally. A major reason why Greeks have a high rate of illegal entry is that as seamen, the oppor tunity for illegal entry has been greater than for many other nationality groups. Whereas worldwide, in FY Hemisphere! and Tables VII (Europe and Greece !, 1970 -1976 Tables I and VIII. The slight upturn for Greece in FY 1976 appears to be a function of the even more rapid decrease in preference and nonpreference visas issued abroad, and its effect of the availability of slots for ad justments of status.
1976, the modal status at entry for deportable aliens was «entry without inspection» (mainly from Mexico and Canada), for Europe it was that of «visitor», and for Greece, crewmen who were «willful violators» (28.7 per cent), that is seamen who jumped ship. Another 38.2 per cent were in technical violation because of delayed ship departures.17
A brief look at the trend in Greek deportable aliens located, by status at entry, since F Y 1969 reveals a con tinuing rise in the number found deportable among those who entered as visitors. A similar trend is evident for those who entered as students, except for a slight reversal in FY 1975. For crewmen, a downturn in numbers is evident since FY 1973, when the Immigra tion and Naturalization Service began a systematic crackdown on this obvious method of illegal entry. The trend data are presented in Table 4 . , 1969 -1975 Table 30, 1976 conclusions It is evident that the apparent decline in demand for available visas must be appraised with some care, since, in fact, the opportunity structure itself is constantly changing in ways that are not always obvious. The 1965 Act itself has been designed in such a way that changes in the number of immigrant visas which can be issued annually can occur despite a steady demand, pro vided only that demand becomes heavier in another country within the same Hemisphere. Furthermore, changes in administrative policy in Washington, such as the tightening or relaxation of labor certification pro cedures, or, at the local level, in the exercise of consular discretion-e.g., as to who is excludable because of the 17. 1976 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Table 30. danger of becoming a public charge-can and do affect the opportunity structure. When the normal ways of entry dry up, alternate routes are sought by those who are excluded. These ways may be formally legitimate, or illegitimate, depending on the specific opportunity structure in effect at any given time. In essence, the number and kinds of visas, and the amount of illegal en try, is governed by an opportunity structure defined by immigration law, federal regulation of the responsible departments, administrative discretion, and surveillance at borders and ports of entry.
As far as Greece is concerned, the design of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act most probably af fected the downward trend in visa issuance since FY 1969, although the very design of the legislation makes it difficult to ascertain precisely the extent to which intra-Hemispheric competition affects the opportunities of any one country.18
But it is apparent that both administrative policy in Washington, especially with respect to labor certifica tion regulations, and the exercise of administrative discretion at the consular level, have contributed to the decline in immigrant visa issuance, evidently in con sonance with economic pressures in the United States. This is not to gainsay the relationship of events in north western Europe or Greece to these migration trends.
The number of US immigrant visas issued to Greeks in FY 1976 still was substantially above that of FY 1965, the last year of the McCarran-Walter Act, and is 18. It will be even more difficult to ascertain from now on, due to recently passed legislation which combines the hemispheric ceilings and preferences, creating worldwide competition for visa numbers and preferences, rather than Hemispheric competition.
indicative of a continuing demand within the limits of the opportunity structure. The use of adjustments of status by Greeks in disproportionate numbers to gain third and sixth preference and nonpreference visas, and their attempts to enter illegally, are also indicative of continuing demand, a demand which must be viewed in the context of the limitations of the opportunity struc ture defined by American immigration law.
